I am an empirical capital-markets accounting researcher whose work is grounded in information economics and industrial organization. My research studies how information is produced, transmitted, and used in financial markets when agents face attention, monitoring, and institutional constraints. A central theme of my work is that networks formed through shared economic agents (e.g., managers, directors, and auditors) transmit information about reporting practices and prior interactions, generating spillovers that shape both corporate disclosure choices and external monitoring.

In this agenda, the same network-based informational link can alter (i) the incentives and credibility of forward-looking disclosure and (ii) the allocation and intensity of oversight by market and regulatory monitors. Methodologically, my work combines large-scale panel data, network-based designs, and quasi-experimental identification strategies to test mechanism-driven predictions.

My research has been published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, and Advances in Accounting, with several active working papers that extend this agenda. I teach financial accounting and financial statement analysis at the undergraduate and graduate levels.